

A Constructive, Long-Term Chinese-U.S. Relationship

By Henry Kissinger

NEW YORK — The debate evoked by Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Beijing sit has been too much about whether his mission "failed" to promote human rights. The main consideration ought to be whether America's overall political relationship with the key country for long-term stability in Asia is being put at risk.

The public confrontation in Beijing was all the more dramatic because it occurred at the end of a period of steadily improving American-Chinese relations. In October, President Bill Clinton lifted the ban on cabinet-level meetings that had been in effect since the Beijing uprising in 1989; shortly after, he met with President Jiang Zemin. Many cabinet-level meetings followed, including several between Mr. Christopher and the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen.

The administration, using the formula that it was challenging certain Chinese practices and not the Communist system, significantly reduced its terms for extension of most-favored-nation status. The Chinese leaders had hinted at a willingness to accommodate concerns not found to be incompatible with Chinese law — an elastic criterion.

What then went awry with a visit that had reasonably been expected to culminate this progress? The chief problem was conceptual. The administration, very conscious of domestic pressures, seemed to think that the Chinese "owed" it human rights concessions in return for restoring high-level contacts.

The Chinese, implementing traditional diplomacy, base concessions on reciprocity; they consider that they are entitled to the same unconditional high-level contacts extended to

them by all other nations. They therefore evaluate their concessions in terms of reciprocal acts that benefit them. They do not view the removal of a unilateral threat as a concession, and they are extraordinarily touchy regarding any hint of intervention in their domestic affairs. So long as human rights remain the principal subject of the Chinese-American dialogue, deadlock is nearly inevitable.

Nevertheless, the deadlock is not irretrievable. The issue is not, as is sometimes claimed, whether America should abandon its pursuit of human rights altogether, but how to pursue its values in balance with other crucial aspects of the complex U.S.-Chinese relationship.

The fundamental motivation of U.S. human rights policy rests deep within the American tradition. No other nation has been so explicitly founded to vindicate liberty or been populated as extensively by refugees. The American experience has therefore infused foreign policy with a unique missionary quality. Other nations need to take this attitude seriously; to most Americans, the national interest cannot be separated from some concern for human rights.

On the other hand, America's perception of itself as the defender of global human rights is so ingrained that we Americans too often forget how unique that perspective is compared to the way other nations view foreign policy. Every other major country perceives foreign policy as the balancing of risks and rewards so as to affect the actions of other societies outside their borders. What Americans call human rights have generally been deemed to fall within the

domestic jurisdiction of societies and thus not to be the subject of diplomacy.

The State Department insists that it is not pressing the Chinese government to change its domestic institutions, only to live up to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The fact remains that no other signatory of that United Nations document has invoked it in its China policy. This raises the question of whether it is an obligation of the United States to enforce every United Nations document unilaterally, even when all the other signatories ignore it.

In short, the American human rights approach to China elicits next to no support from most other governments. Not a single Asian nation supports it; not one of them would stand with America if a major crisis resulted.

Precisely insistence on sovereignty is a particular attribute of the Chinese government. Western intervention is perceived as an uninterrupted humiliation since the Opium Wars, although America is blamed less than other societies.

To base Chinese-U.S. relations entirely on progress toward human rights will therefore mortgage both the underlying relationship as well as progress on human rights.

It is also a distortion of reality, since American objectives go beyond the promotion of human rights. It has become commonplace to point out that China has the world's fastest growing economy and that its population of more than a billion represents the single largest market. To exclude the United States from these prospects is not a trivial decision — espe-

cially as every other industrial nation will eagerly fill a vacuum left by America.

More importantly, Asia is both the most dynamic region of the world and the one with the greatest potential to threaten world peace. Its nations have not developed the patterns of cooperation that emerged in Europe after World War II. In Asia, there is no equivalent of NATO, the European Union or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Like the nations of 19th century Europe, the Asian states eye each other as potential strategic competitors and conduct their relationships at least in part on the basis of geopolitics. Fostering an Asian equilibrium is therefore central to world peace and must be a key objective of American diplomacy.

Stability in Asia is most likely if China and the United States participate. Conflict with China would require Washington to organize all the rest of Asia against Beijing. While an overbearing Chinese foreign policy could at some point drive American foreign policy to such an expedient, nothing in the contemporary world calls for a policy of isolating China, especially at a moment when the United States also is confronting Japan over trade issues. No Asian country will participate in a policy of isolating China over human rights; America will only wind up isolating itself and losing its ability to shape a stable order.

America and China have a parallel interest in equilibrium in Asia. As the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 emphasized, both countries have their reasons for opposing the domination of Asia by a single country.

China wants the United States to help balance its relationships with powerful neighbors — Japan, Russia and India — at least until it is strong enough to do so on its own. The United States needs Chinese cooperation on these matters as well as on a peaceful evolution of the future of Taiwan, on nuclear proliferation as in North Korea, and on the transfer of weapons technology.

These are the sort of issues which should be key elements of the Chinese-American dialogue at least for the next decade.

If they moved to the center of Chinese-American relationships, they would facilitate human rights issues by providing a strategic context. In the course of their country's long history, China's leaders have frequently taken account of the special needs of their counterparts, provided such an action also served Chinese interests. What they will not accept, or will accept only under extreme duress, is the implication that America bestows its cooperation as a special favor to be withheld at will.

The element of reciprocity has been sorely missing in current Chinese-American relations. The United States put forward a catalogue of human rights in return for which it offers the extension of most-favored-nation status — something which to the Chinese looks like the temporary lifting of unilateral blackmail. And although high-level contacts have been resumed and seem to be progressing on the economic side, they are clearly secondary in the political area to maneuvering on trade status.

In my view, the principal reason for the aura of confrontation during Mr. Christopher's visit to Beijing was the neuralgic Chinese reaction to unilateral demands, compounded by a publicity that focused nearly exclusively on human rights. In the prelude to the visit — including at several stops on the secretary's



trip — it was stated officially and repeatedly that the Chinese leaders knew what they had to do on human rights, implying that the U.S. delegation came for the primary purpose of evaluating Chinese concessions.

The Chinese, having a tendency to consider every gesture as symbolic, interpreted the designation of the assistant secretary for human rights, John Shattuck, as "advance man" for the secretary's trip as a signal that human rights were to be its principal focus. The stage having been set for a confrontation, the Chinese side showed its own skill at devising provocative acts, such as harassing dissidents on the eve of Mr. Christopher's arrival.

The basic challenge remains: if the United States' interest in China is primarily human rights, the tactic of public pressures is appropriate. And it may even work. There is, however, a high risk of trapping both sides in a choice between capitulation and confrontation. The administration may be tempted to continue watering down both its demands and its penalties until its apparent victories are largely public relations exercises. The Chinese may repeat their self-inflicted wounds of the 1950s when they expelled all Soviet advisers for being too intrusive. The victim of such a process will be the U.S.-Chinese political relationship that is key to Asian stability.

But if, as I believe, America has other objectives that it must serve simultaneously, then a more reciprocal pattern is necessary.

An alternative approach would not require America to abandon the current reduced list of human rights objectives, although some may have to be modified in the course of negotiations. It does, however, call for clear presidential leadership outlining American purposes and strategy with respect to China. Such a statement needs to set forth the importance attached to U.S.-Chinese cooperation in specific areas and on specific topics; it cannot

merely be a shopping list of U.S. priorities.

At the same time, such a document could emphasize the need for each side to take into account the special concerns of the other — a phrase that Beijing will surely understand as referring to American human rights concerns. I believe that a reduction of public pressures and a genuine broadening of the dialogue will produce a solution compatible with the self-respect of both sides. China should understand that a concern for human rights in some form is not an administration idiosyncrasy but inherent in the American value system as expressed in congressional pressures.

The Clinton administration should recognize that China's interest in American relations is based on its expectation of cooperation on global or at least Asian strategy. For that objective, it may well be prepared to make human rights concessions, provided they can be presented as having emerged from its own free choice.

The U.S. Congress should understand that, beyond a certain point, public pressures tend to produce the opposite of what is intended, as was the case with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Congressional concern has been clearly demonstrated: the administration should be permitted to address it quietly on its own.

The short-term objective of a renewed Chinese-American dialogue should be to achieve sufficient progress to enable the administration to de-link human rights from trade status once and for all. Afterward, the United States would pursue human rights objectives in a manner compatible with Chinese dignity and via normal diplomatic processes within the context of an overall political and strategic dialogue.

From my knowledge of the leaders of both sides, these goals are within reach provided the focus remains on fundamentals, especially on the importance for both countries of a constructive long-term Chinese-American relationship.

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Appeasers of China's Rulers Should Be Ashamed

By A. M. Rosenthal

WASHINGTON — After a meeting with the prime minister of Communist China, the prime minister of Japan had this to say: "I told him that it is not proper to force a Western or European-type democracy onto others."

According to press reports, the prime minister of Japan, Morihiro Hosokawa, also said that the "Western" concept of human rights should not be applied to all nations.

Wrapped up in those statements are the historical falsehood, ethical duplicity, human callousness and political betrayal that the international China lobby now deploys to carry out its latest assignment from Beijing.

The job is to pressure the Clinton administration to renege on its pledge that unless Beijing shows some respect for the human rights of Chinese and Tibetans, the United States will end China's low tariff privileges.

What arrogance — for a Japanese prime minister to talk so. Does he think people have forgotten that millions of Asians, Europeans and Americans had to die to defeat Japanese imperialism and allow democracy to be "forced" on Japan — the system that allowed him to be elected, become prime minister and run about kowtowing to the Chinese Communists and insulting our intelligence?

Mr. Hosokawa is Japan's business, but his line is at the heart of the propaganda of the businessmen and politicians who make up the American branch of the China lobby.

In Washington suddenly, people who believe in human rights are being pictured as cultural

and political imperialists trying to push around a bunch of dignified old Confucianists.

The truth is that nobody is dreaming of "forcing" Western democracy on Communist China; such a sinful thought. American human rights policy asks simply that Beijing permit some of the decency to which it is already pledged as a member of the United Nations and signatory to a variety of international conventions. For example: the right to dissent without being arrested, tortured and imprisoned for years; the right of Tibet to negotiate for at least partial freedom after a half-century of Chinese captivity.

Please, please do these things, the United States begs. If not, at last we will have to do what Congress has demanded for years — refuse to cooperate with Chinese despotism by continuing the low tariff rates that oil its economy.

Forget that sociodrive about Confucianist traditions being at odds with "Western" human rights. The Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi puts it straight in the Los Angeles Times: The Communists fight human rights not because they are Confucianists but because they are Leninists. For all its increasing armed power, Beijing, like all dictatorships, knows the greater power of creeping freedom.

Is there one member of the China lobby who respects himself enough to speak the truth? Listen, American businessmen are in China to make money in a cheap labor market. If U.S.

human rights policy interferes with that by upsetting the Communists, to hell with it.

We get only the pious line about how a strong Chinese economy will bring more human rights — presumably as under the economies of imperial Japan and Hitler's Germany.

Decision time for President Bill Clinton is May or June. He is being pulled one way and another. A president gets paid to be pulled one way or another — and remain true to his word.

Rumors float: The fix is in for Beijing, the lobby has won. Government officials of honor say that no, the struggle goes on, and I believe them. Maybe Beijing will make the concessions. Those low tariffs mean a lot to them. The dictatorship will not change much. At least the United States will have kept faith with the people in the torture cells.

But the American businesses in the China lobby — they have lost already. They have shown themselves panting eager to use the greatest American asset — the economic power created by free labor and capitalist strength — to bolster a government built on controlled labor and police strength. They certainly will not be respected in China.

At home? Certainly it has happened before — the arming of foreign dictatorships that prostitutes American idealism, endangers American security and produces a new generation of American cynics. But that does not make it any easier for Americans who believe in political freedom to watch, excuse or forget.

The New York Times.

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ed Fin Aug	6½	97	100½	6.39
o Can Sep	7¼	02	100½	7.09
o Co Mr	9¼	16	110½	6.79
Apr	5½	98	98	6.20
Feb	5½	99	96½	6.20
est Fin	5½	99	97½	6.10

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ry Tsy Apr 4%	96	98½	5.9
ry Tsy Jan 5	97	97½	5.9
ry Tsy May 4½	93	95½	7.3
Amra May 3½	96	95½	5.8

Player	Team	Pos	Age	Height	Weight	Experience	Salary
Tommy Lasorda	Los Angeles	Manager	54	5'10"	170	10	\$1,000,000
Steve Garvey	Los Angeles	1B	30	5'11"	180	5	\$1,000,000
Steve Nouri	Los Angeles	2B	26	5'10"	170	2	\$1,000,000
Mike Torrealba	Los Angeles	3B	26	5'10"	170	2	\$1,000,000
Mike Torrealba	Los Angeles	SS	26	5'10"	170	2	\$1,000,000
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